#27 Financial Market Outlook [20261004] Even as employment collapsed, interest rates did not fall—a week where 'textbook variables' stopped working
This week, U.S. employment statistics failed to reach even one-third of market expectations, and the probability of a Fed rate hike in October collapsed from about 70% to around 20% in one week. If things followed the textbook, this would be a moment for long-term interest rates to fall significantly. However, the U.S. 10-year yield hit 5.34%, a level not seen since 2002 on Thursday, and even on Friday, the day of the employment report, it closed higher.
The same ‘discrepancy’ is occurring simultaneously in four markets this week. Even though the 10-year Japanese yen interest rate is in the 3% range for the first time in 30 years, the yen is being sold, and even though aircraft carriers have been reinforced in the Middle East, crude oil remains flat, while diesel fuel burned instead. And in a week where the Nikkei Stock Average rose nearly 3%, the TOPIX fell.
There is one common factor. What is moving prices is no longer ‘textbook variables’ like the economy or policy interest rates, but politics and supply-demand. I will organize this week’s points into four items.
Topic 1: U.S. 10-year 5.34%—The true nature of ‘interest rates that don’t fall even when the Fed stops’
[News Source]: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Employment Situation, September 2026) / CNBC (Fed rate hike odds after jobs report) / Quartz (10-year yield highest since 2002) / FRED (10-year minus 2-year yield spread) / Federal Reserve (H.15) / BNN Bloomberg
Summary of Content
Non-farm payrolls in September increased by 29,000 from the previous month, significantly lower than the market expectation of around 90,000. The unemployment rate rose to 4.2%, average hourly earnings slowed to 0.1% month-on-month and 3.0% year-on-year, and the figures for July and August were revised downward by a total of 60,000. With the August PCE on Wednesday also falling below expectations, the probability of a rate hike at the FOMC on October 27-28 dropped from about 70% at the beginning of the week to around 20%. On the other hand, the probability of a December rate hike remains over 75%, and Chicago Fed President Goolsbee has not abandoned the recognition that ‘the problem is on the inflation side’.
Even so, the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield hit a high of 5.34% at one point on Thursday, the 1st, a level not seen since 2002, and closed at 5.28% on Friday, the 2nd (+11bp from the previous weekend). The rise in the 10-year yield in the July-September quarter was the largest quarterly increase this century, and the 30-year mortgage rate climbed into the 7% range for the first time since early 2025.
Professional Commentary
The most important number in the bond market this week is not the level of the 10-year yield, but the shape of the curve.
From the beginning of the week (9/28) to Friday, the 2-year Treasury yield fell from 4.92% to 4.83%, and the 10-year Treasury rose from 5.24% to 5.28%. The difference between the 2-year and 10-year widened from 32bp to 45bp, an expansion of 13bp in just five business days. The short-term zone honestly priced in ‘passing on the October rate hike,’ but only the long-term zone rejected it—this is twist steepening.
The implication is clear: long-term interest rates have been decoupled from the Fed’s policy path. What is currently being added to the 10-year Treasury is not rate hike expectations, but a term premium (an additional reward for holding for a long time). Since August, the Treasury Department has expanded buybacks of long-term bonds to three times the normal scale, but interest rates have continued to rise anyway. A buyback of several billion dollars at a time cannot absorb government debt that is expanding at a pace of around $2 trillion per year and the inflation uncertainty stemming from high crude oil prices. There is no remaining capacity on the buyer side to take on duration.
To speak specifically about what happened on the ground, bonds were bought once immediately after the employment statistics. Positions betting on ‘weak indicators = lower interest rates’ entered. However, the buying did not continue, and the yield rebounded and closed higher than the previous day. In a market where bonds are not bought on bad indicators, bonds no longer function as a hedge for stocks. This is the coldest reality that has accumulated at the bottom of investor sentiment this week.
The proof of this is gold. In the review for the week of September 14-18, I mentioned gold as a ‘portfolio diversification axis,’ but since then, gold futures have fallen about 4% from $4,341 to $4,162. I will frankly revise my assessment. In a world of real interest rates where the yield on 10-year Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) is around 2.9%, the cost of holding assets that do not generate interest is too heavy. That is why gold was sold even as geopolitical risks increased.
The trigger for next week is the concentration of three auctions in this one week. A total of $119 billion: $58 billion in 3-year notes on Tuesday the 6th, $39 billion in 10-year notes on Wednesday the 7th, and $22 billion in 30-year bonds on Thursday the 8th. Furthermore, the minutes of the September FOMC meeting will be released on the night of the 7th (early morning of the 8th, Japan time). It is said that four members expected two additional rate hikes within the year at the September meeting, and Dallas Fed President Logan has stated that at least a 50bp additional rate hike is necessary. If the minutes are read as hawkish, and on top of that, there is a tail (the winning yield is higher than the market rate) in the 10-year and 30-year auctions, a re-trial of 5.34% is quite possible. The key levels are 5.34% (this week’s high) on the upside, and 5.17% (previous weekend) on the downside. Unless these are broken, it is dangerous to build positions on the premise that ‘if the Fed stops, interest rates will fall’.
⛓️ Logical Chain A: Probability of an October rate hike retreats from about 70% to around 20% due to employment stall and PCE downside → B: While short-term bonds are bought, long-term bonds are sold due to term premiums, and the 2-year to 10-year spread widens by 13bp in one week (twist steepening). Bonds stop functioning as a hedge against ‘bad indicators’ → C: Risk of a ‘no-hedge’ phase where stocks, bonds, and gold are sold simultaneously rises
Topic 2: Government voices in the BOJ’s ‘Summary of Opinions’—Why the yen is not being bought even at 3% yen interest rates
[News Source]:Minkabu FX (Yen selling intensifies triggered by BOJ Summary of Opinions)/Nikkei (No currency intervention conducted in the one month up to September 28)/Nikkei (Pricing in of consecutive October rate hikes retreats in Japan and the US)/Bloomberg (September Tankan)/Bloomberg (Tokyo Core CPI)/Minkabu FX (CFTC Position Report)/TV Asahi ANN (Draft of Policy Speech)
Summary of Content
Although the BOJ’s ‘Summary of Opinions’ (for the September meeting) released on the 1st suggested continued additional rate hikes, there was no description hinting at consecutive or large-scale rate hikes. In addition, it was revealed that the government (Cabinet Office) side had expressed the opinion that ‘we would like you to sufficiently inspect the cumulative effects of past rate hikes,’ causing the dollar-yen to rise from the 157.30 yen level to 158.40 yen, with the weekly high at 158.45 yen. For the week, it saw wild fluctuations between 156.38 yen and 158.45 yen.
The September Tankan released on the same day showed large manufacturers at plus 24, an improvement for the 6th consecutive period and the highest level since March 2018, while non-manufacturers were at plus 35, a deterioration for the first time in 5 periods. The Tokyo core CPI for September released on the 2nd was 2.7% year-on-year, entering the 2% range for the first time in 8 months and exceeding market expectations, but this was largely due to special factors such as the end of free basic water charges and the reaction to free childcare fees. The Ministry of Finance announced that currency intervention from August 27 to September 28 was zero, confirming that the rate check late on September 18 did not involve actual intervention. The pricing in of consecutive BOJ rate hikes in October remains at the 20% level (as of September 30).
Professional Comments
The ‘distortion’ that occurred in Japan this week is that the yen was sold even though three factors for a rate hike were aligned. The Tankan for manufacturers is at an 8.5-year high, Tokyo CPI has returned to the 2% range, and the 10-year yen interest rate is around 3.09%, a 30-year high. Normally, the yen would be bought.
The reason the yen was sold despite this lies in the content of the ‘Summary of Opinions.’ The market read this time that a ‘political’ variable has been added to the BOJ’s reaction function. No matter how strong the data is, as long as the government is demanding an ‘inspection of cumulative effects,’ a consecutive rate hike in October is difficult. The moment it is read that the ‘timing’ of additional rate hikes will be delayed, the reason to buy the yen disappears.
What should be grasped here is the ‘quality’ of the rise in yen interest rates. If interest rates rise and the currency is also bought, it is proof that funds seeking returns are entering. However, if yen bonds are sold and the yen is also sold as it was this week, then what is rising is not returns but risk premium—a vigilance fee for fiscal policy. It is reported that in the extraordinary Diet session on the 5th, Prime Minister Takaichi is moving to position a bill for a consumption tax cut on food limited to two years starting next April as the ‘first year of responsible proactive fiscal policy.’ If fiscal expansion is declared without specific discussion on funding sources, the yen bond market has no choice but to add that ‘vigilance fee’ on top.
The tilt of positions has also changed. In the IMM currency futures as of September 29, speculative yen net longs shrank by 16,542 contracts from the previous week to 55,440 contracts, and leveraged funds (hedge funds) have turned to net short on the yen. The yen longs that had been built up betting on ‘intervention and BOJ rate hikes’ have been dumped, and the flow of short-term players is tilting back toward yen selling.
Here, I will also verify the assessment from the review two weeks ago. I wrote that the three-day weekend in Tokyo from September 21 to 23 was the ‘best condition for the intervening side,’ but as the Ministry of Finance announced, no actual intervention occurred during the holiday. The authorities got through it with rate checks and verbal intervention from Japan and the US. However, after hitting the 159 yen level on September 24, it plunged to the 156 yen level due to yen-selling restraint comments from Japanese and US authorities, and the structure of the defense line where ‘Japan and the US speak out simultaneously just before 160 yen’ has actually been strengthened.
Next week, the Tokyo schedule itself is a risk factor. On the 5th (Mon) is the policy speech, the following 6th (Tue) is the 10-year JGB auction (about 2.6 trillion yen), at 15:35 on the same day Governor Ueda and Finance Minister Katayama will give greetings at the National Securities Convention, and on the 8th (Thu) is the 30-year JGB auction. ‘Fiscal declaration → JGB absorption → Monetary policy message’ are lined up in 48 hours. If the policy speech shows a strong fiscal expansion color, the 10-year auction is weak, and Governor Ueda does not show a positive stance toward an October rate hike, the yen will be sold from three directions. Furthermore, the 12th (Mon) is Sports Day, so Tokyo will have another three-day weekend.
The turning points are 158.45 yen (this week’s high) and the 200-day moving average in the mid-158 yen range, followed by the 159 yen range (9/24 high) and 160 yen. The downside is 156.38 yen (this week’s low).
⛓️ Logical Chain A: The government’s check on rate hikes appears in the Bank of Japan’s ‘Main Opinions,’ and the Prime Minister moves toward declaring fiscal expansion through food tax cuts → B: The rise in yen interest rates is interpreted not as a ‘return’ but as a ‘fiscal risk premium,’ and leveraged funds shift to net yen selling → C: The yen and Japanese government bonds fall simultaneously, increasing the risk of a ‘bureaucratic dependency’ structure where currency relies on intervention and bonds rely on auction absorption
Topic 3: Crude oil settles, diesel burns—the midterm election calendar determines energy markets
[News Source]: Reuters (Oil settles lower after Europe agrees to tap diesel reserves) / Bloomberg (G7 to Release Up to 100 Million Barrels) / OilPrice.com (China Halts October Fuel Exports) / The Moscow Times (Russia extends diesel export ban) / DTN (US distillate inventories) / CNBC (Third carrier group, Iran strikes after midterms) / AGBI (OPEC+ Sunday meeting) / OilPrice.com (Gulf Supply Improves) / Bloomberg via Rigzone (US SPR tranche)
Summary
On the 2nd, the G7 announced that, under IEA coordination, it would release up to 100 million barrels of crude oil and diesel reserves over the next four months, with diesel being released on an accelerated schedule during the first 20 days. However, the breakdown between new releases and previously promised amounts was not provided. Brent closed at $102.25 that day, remaining almost flat at +0.1% for the week on a front-month basis, while WTI was down 1.6% for the week at $91.11.
The epicenter of supply is shifting from crude oil to refined products. Major Chinese refineries have halted most fuel exports for October, and Russia has extended its diesel export ban until October 31. In the US, distillate inventories have fallen to a seasonal record low of 105.2 million barrels, and the Trump administration has pressured Europe to release reserves by hinting at diesel export restrictions. Meanwhile, President Trump stated that resuming attacks on Iran after the November 3 midterm elections is ‘possible,’ and a third carrier strike group is expected to be deployed to the Middle East by November. OPEC+ is expected to keep November production targets unchanged at its meeting on the 4th, and production by the G7 in August was about 5 million barrels per day lower than pre-war levels.
Professional Commentary
Additional carrier deployments, China’s export halt, reports of Saudi plans to attack the Houthis—even with all these factors, Brent remained flat for the week. There is some truth to the view that ‘the geopolitical premium for crude oil has structurally dulled.’ Saudi Arabia has resumed loading from Yanbu on the Red Sea side, and the flow of crude oil from the Gulf has recovered through detours and ship-to-ship transfers.
However, if you misunderstand the explanation for ‘why it is dull,’ you will misjudge next month’s risks. The commonly cited logic that ‘we are safe because OPEC+ has over 5 million barrels per day of spare capacity’ does not hold up now.The fact that G7 production is about 5 million barrels per day lower than pre-war levels means that the true nature of that ‘spare capacity’ is production trapped inside the Strait of Hormuz. It is not a buffer; it is merely measuring the size of the hole. And the East-West pipeline, which was the key bypass, became a target for attacks in September. The detour is an alternative route, but it is also a new weak point.
The real reason crude oil looks calm is that the epicenter of the tightness has shifted from crude oil to diesel (distillates). Three of the world’s most flexible product exporters—China, Russia, and the US—have simultaneously shifted to ‘domestic priority.’ Even if crude oil arrives, refined products are no longer crossing borders. The G7’s reserve release is designed to ‘accelerate diesel in 20 days’ because the authorities also accurately grasp where the tightness is.
And what cannot be overlooked is the midterm election calendar. To lower fuel prices before the election, the White House is pulling every lever it can: pressure on the G7, threats of export restrictions, and additional releases from strategic reserves. The US is not a ‘buyer’ of reserves; it is still a ‘seller.’ Meanwhile, resuming attacks after the election is considered ‘possible,’ and the third carrier group will be in place in November. In other words, until November 3, a ‘political put’ where policy caps prices is in effect, and after the election, that cap is removed, leaving a geopolitical ‘call’—an asymmetric structure divided by dates.
Specific triggers from next week onwards are: (1) the results of the OPEC+ meeting on the 4th (at the opening of the week), (2) export quotas after China’s National Day holiday on the 7th—if the resumption of exports is postponed here, the diesel shortage will deepen further, (3) the 20-day period for the G7’s accelerated diesel release (until late October), (4) the October 31 deadline for the Russian export ban, and (5) the November 3 midterm elections. Price benchmarks are $100 for Brent (the level it briefly dipped below and returned to on Friday) and the previous month’s high of $106, and for WTI, Friday’s low of $88 range.
⛓️ Logical Chain A: While Middle Eastern crude oil logistics are recovering, China, Russia, and the US are tightening product exports, and the G7 is releasing diesel fuel ahead of schedule → B: The epicenter of the supply crunch is shifting from crude oil to diesel, and near-term prices are being suppressed by pre-election policy responses → C: After the midterm elections (11/3), the ‘political put’ will be removed, and the risk of re-ignited inflation expectations will rise due to the combination of renewed attack risks and winter fuel demand
Topic 4: Nikkei 225 up 3,290 yen in two weeks, TOPIX ±0—What the 16.7x NT ratio reveals about ‘adaptation to interest rates’
[News Source]:Kabutan (This week’s quick stock market summary)/Nikkei (Nikkei 225 closes down 647 yen, high interest rates are a burden)/CNBC (Micron Q4 earnings)/Yahoo Finance (Stock market today, Oct 2)/Advisor Perspectives (S&P 500 Snapshot)/Kabutan (Market Daily Report Oct 2)
Summary
US-based Micron Technology’s June-August earnings showed revenue of $54.2 billion (approx. 4.8x year-on-year), exceeding expectations, and their revenue forecast for September-November of approximately $61.5 billion also beat market expectations (approx. $57 billion). Following this, the Nikkei 225 surged 2,203 yen (3.30%) on the 1st, and for the week, it rose 1,945 yen (2.9%) to 68,309 yen, marking its third consecutive week of gains. Meanwhile, the TOPIX fell 0.9% for the week to 4,091.00, its first decline in three weeks, with 26 out of 33 TSE industry sectors falling. The sectors with the largest declines were other financing, securities, and insurance, while domestic demand stocks such as real estate and land transportation were also weak.
In the US, the S&P 500 was down 0.3% for the week and the Dow was down 1.3%, while the Nasdaq was up 0.5%, hitting an intraday high on Friday. Compared to the S&P 500’s year-to-date gain of 12.8%, the equal-weighted version only rose 9.5%.
Professional Commentary
In my review from two weeks ago, I wrote that ‘weekly data hides extreme concentration.’ This week, it isn’t even hidden anymore.
Let’s look at the numbers for the two weeks. From September 18 to October 2, the Nikkei 225 went from 65,018 yen to 68,309 yen, a **+3,290 yen (+5.1%) gain**. The TOPIX went from 4,091.14 to 4,091.00, a −0.14 point change. It is completely flat** . The NT ratio jumped from 15.89x to 16.07x to 16.70x, an increase of 0.8x in just two weeks. This means the index was pushed up only by a very small number of high-priced semiconductor stocks.
Reading this as the ‘strength of the AI market’ is only half correct. The other half is adaptation to interest rates. In a world where the US 10-year is in the 5% range and the Japanese 10-year is in the 3% range, the discount rate for stocks rises. In such an environment, the only stocks you can buy are those that can demonstrate ‘growth exceeding interest rates’ in their numbers. Micron’s earnings showed exactly that, so capital concentrated there. Conversely, capital flowed out of sectors where rising interest rates directly lead to increased costs or valuation losses—real estate, non-banks (other financing), securities, and insurance. **This concentration is not proof of strength, but rather the market’s ‘evacuation behavior’ in response to rising interest rates.**
I will also revise my outlook here. In my review from two weeks ago, I wrote in the points to watch that ‘the financial sector has a structural tailwind in terms of interest margins,’ but this week in Japan, financial-related stocks were among the worst-performing sectors. When the rise in long-term interest rates is not due to economic strength but rather derived from the term premium (caution regarding fiscal policy), the negative impact of bond unrealized losses for insurance companies and earnings deterioration for securities firms due to market cooling takes effect before any improvement in interest margins. I am narrowing my premise: financial stocks only benefit from rising interest rates during ‘good interest rate hikes.’
Regarding supply and demand, the schedule is something to be wary of. The new TOPIX constituent stocks will be announced on Wednesday the 7th, the option SQ is on Friday the 9th, and Monday the 12th is a public holiday, creating a three-day weekend. Positions concentrated in semiconductors will pass through two ‘forced trading’ events simultaneously: the SQ and position adjustments before the long weekend. The more the index depends on a few stocks, the more the index will swing beyond its fundamentals due to the unwinding of those few stocks. The upside resistance levels are 69,000 yen (the 1st’s high range) and 70,000 yen, and the downside support is the 75-day moving average at the 66,700 yen level.
⛓️ Logical Chain A: With the US 10-year in the 5% range and the Japanese 10-year in the 3% range, the stock discount rate rose, and at the same time, Micron presented ‘growth exceeding interest rates’ → B: Capital concentrated in semiconductors, with the Nikkei 225 up 5.1% and TOPIX ±0 (NT ratio 16.70x) in two weeks, while capital flowed out of interest-rate-sensitive sectors → C: Ahead of the SQ (10/9) and the three-day weekend, the risk of unwinding concentrated positions causing the index to swing beyond its fundamentals has increased
☆ Next week’s market outlook and summary
Points to watch
1. Three US Treasury auctions + FOMC minutes concentrated in the same week (the biggest point of caution)
Between the 6th and 8th, there will be auctions for 3-year, 10-year, and 30-year bonds totaling $119 billion, and the minutes from the September FOMC meeting will be released on the night of the 7th (early morning of the 8th, Japan time). What was proven this week is that ‘long-term interest rates do not fall even with weak indicators.’ If that is the case, the only material that could lower long-term interest rates is strong auction results. Conversely, if there is a tail in the 10-year and 30-year auctions, a re-trial of 5.34% will come into view, and stocks will undergo a correction that looks like a ‘decline for no reason.’ This is a phase where positions should be built by removing the premise that ‘if the Fed stops, interest rates will fall.’
2. 48 hours in Tokyo (5th-6th) — Fiscal policy, auctions, and the Bank of Japan line up
With the flow of the policy speech (5th) followed by the 10-year JGB auction and Governor Ueda’s remarks (6th), if the three factors of fiscal expansion, weak auction results, and the Governor’s cautious stance on rate hikes align, the yen will likely break through the 200-day moving average in the mid-158 range and test the 159 level. On the other hand, the level just before 160 is where Japanese and US authorities have intervened verbally in the past, and since the blank period for actual intervention has continued since late August, the price movement when it happens will be significant. For dollar-yen positions, you must redesign your stop-loss placement under the assumption that the price could jump 2-3 yen in an instant. Do not forget that Tokyo will have another three-day weekend due to the holiday on the 12th.
3. China’s ‘post-National Day’ on the 7th — A turning point for diesel shortages
If China does not resume fuel exports in October, it will overlap with Russia’s embargo (until the 31st) and record-low US inventories, further deepening the diesel shortage. This will affect inflation expectations through transportation and logistics costs before it affects crude oil prices. This is a path that reinforces the structure seen in Topic 1, where ‘long-term interest rates do not fall,’ from the energy side.
4. Unwinding of ‘concentrated positions’ before SQ and the long weekend
The more the Nikkei Stock Average depends on a few semiconductor stocks, the more the index’s volatility will be amplified by the SQ on the 9th and position adjustments before the long weekend. It is dangerous right now to read the rise in the Nikkei as ‘strength in the underlying Japanese stock market’ and apply leverage.
Points of Expectation
1. ‘Resolution of uncertainty’ after the midterm elections — but with conditions this year
According to Fidelity’s research, the S&P 500 has risen with a 95% probability in the 12 months following midterm elections since 1938. Nate Silver’s model shows an 86% probability of the Democrats retaking the House and 57% for the Senate, making a ‘divided government’ where either the White House or Congress is split the main scenario. Since a divided government makes it harder to pass large-scale fiscal expansions, it could act in a direction that puts a brake on the rise in term premiums. However, let’s clarify two premises. First, the individual provisions of the 2017 tax cuts (TCJA) were already made permanent by the ‘One Big Beautiful Bill Act’ passed in July 2025, so the argument that ‘tax cuts will expire depending on the election results’ has already disappeared. The benefit of a divided government is limited to ‘stopping additional fiscal expansion,’ not ‘avoiding expiration.’ Second, this year, the possibility of resumed attacks on Iran overlaps after the election. The fact that ‘post-election uncertainty resolution’ and ‘post-election geopolitical risk’ fall on the same date is a decisive difference from past midterm election rallies.
2. Short-term zone of US Treasuries — A place where hedging against ‘bad indicators’ still works
As this week’s twist steepening showed, only the 2-3 year short-term zone is reacting honestly to weak indicators. With long-term bonds failing to function as a hedge for stocks, keeping duration short remains one of the few effective hedges against economic deterioration. The strength of demand in the 3-year note auction on the 6th will be a confirmation factor for this.
3. TOPIX’s domestic demand and interest-rate-sensitive sectors that were ‘left behind’ — Targets for contrarian observation
The divergence of +5.1% for the Nikkei and ±0 for the TOPIX over two weeks will be corrected if the conditions are met. That condition is the stabilization of long-term interest rates. If the US 10-year yield clearly falls below the 5.17% seen at the end of last week and the rise in the 10-year JGB yield stops, there is room for funds to return to sold-off real estate, non-bank, and domestic demand stocks along with a reversal of the NT ratio. Now is not the time to ‘buy,’ but a time to monitor interest rate levels as a trigger.
4. Sectors benefiting from expanding refining margins
With the epicenter of the shortage shifting from crude oil to diesel, the benefits will accrue more to the refining (petroleum and coal products) sector than to crude oil producers. In a situation where crude oil is flat but product prices are strong, refining margins (crack spreads) boost profits. However, there is always policy risk such as G7 reserve releases and price control measures by various countries, and China’s decision on resuming exports (the 7th) will be the first litmus test.
Summary
The essence of this week is that the variables that move prices have changed. In the US, weak employment data could not lower long-term interest rates; in Japan, strong prices and business sentiment could not make the yen buyable; in the Middle East, the deployment of additional aircraft carriers could not push up crude oil; and in Japanese stocks, the rise in the index did not mean a rise in the underlying content. None of these were the result of ‘textbook variables’ like the economy or policy rates, but rather the result of fiscal caution, political intervention, and supply-demand imbalances determining prices.
And in the final week of October, the FOMC (27th-28th) and the BOJ meeting (29th-30th) will follow, and five days later are the US midterm elections. Long-term interest rates, the yen, and crude oil are all converging on the same date in the first week of November. Next week is the one-week run-up to that. It will be a week to determine where ‘textbook variables’ begin to work again—digesting auctions, the 48 hours in Tokyo, and China’s export decisions.
📌 This report is intended for analysis of market-wide, asset class, and sector trends and does not recommend the buying or selling of any specific financial product. Please make investment decisions at your own responsibility.