Trump is winning his trade war, but Americans will pay the price
AUSTIN – Judging from the air of concession wafting across world capitals from Tokyo to Brussels, US President Donald Trump is prevailing in his trade war.
The White House is in a celebratory mood. Almost every day, press conferences and statements catalogue the many supposed benefits flowing from Mr Trump’s strategy.
The strategy has brought trade partners to the negotiating table, is catalysing trillions in foreign investment commitments, protecting America’s strategic industries and generating billions in revenue. So much winning, in Trump-speak.
If success, however, means more jobs, more trade and a stronger economy, the evidence is more suspect. All indications are that Americans will pay more for nearly all the goods they consume when the effects of all the tariffs kick in.
universal baseline tariffs of 10 per cent
have already been in effect since April and will remain in place for around 100 nations with no trade deficits with the US, like Singapore and Australia.
Effective from Aug 7, more than 70 nations
will face “reciprocal” tariffs
, ranging from 10 per cent to 50 per cent.
The concept of reciprocity seems questionable, as Mr Trump’s strategy from the start has been to exert pressure on trade partners rather than strictly mirror their tariffs.
For those nations running a trade surplus with the US, the rate is at least 15 per cent. It is higher still for others, where geopolitics and personal vendettas sharpen the blade.
Brazil, for instance, has no trade surplus with the US. Nevertheless, it has been slapped with a rate of 50 per cent, at least partly because Mr Trump has an issue with the government prosecuting former president and Trump ally Jair Bolsonaro on coup charges.
at a 25 per cent rate
, also faces an unspecified penalty for its import of Russian energy and arms.
The US has also caught on to transshipping, the sly rerouting of goods through lower-tariff nations. This practice now invites a 40 per cent penalty.
More deals are to come, if the President wants them, according to Trade Representative Jamieson Greer in an Aug 1 TV interview.
It is not clear what kind of deal
will be struck with America’s near peer rival
. China poses a peculiar problem and the US is still alternating between confrontation and pressing for an advantage.
“Their economy and ours are like a square peg and a round hole, they don’t really fit together very well,” Mr Greer said.
But what is crystal clear is that America has just executed a major turn, reshaping the post-World War II economy to reflect Mr Trump’s priorities of preserving American dominance in all spheres, from military might and manufacturing to energy.
And the man is just six months into the job.
As Mr Trump is never tired of pointing out, the threat of tariffs has persuaded the European Union and Japan to commit to investing US$600 billion (S$774 billion) and US$550 billion in the US, respectively. Combined with earlier investment commitments, including from Saudi Arabia, Mr Trump has touted the figure of US$12 trillion.
Tariff revenues now make up 5 per cent of federal revenues, much higher than the historical average of 2 per cent. The figures are impressive – US$150 billion was collected in mere months, with projections of “several hundred billions” by the year end.
And American companies can now sell their goods – beef, rice, cars and other items – with zero tariffs in many more nations.
Key American industries are sheltered through sectoral tariffs enacted in auto, steel, aluminium and copper industries. Pharmaceuticals and semiconductors are next in line.
But plenty of fine print applies.
Analysts caution that many pledges from foreign partners may be delayed, only partially fulfilled, or merely symbolic. Foreign investments in the US usually flow in tandem with dollars earned by companies from exports to the US. If tariffs penalise these exports, investing more dollars is challenging.
The actual inflow of foreign investment will likely surpass the levels seen in recent years, say analysts at the Peterson Institute of International Economics (PIIE) in Washington. Just not, they add, by the large margins claimed publicly by Mr Trump.
Dr Marcus Noland, an international trade economist at PIIE, found a clear example of the impact of Mr Trump’s tariffs right in his own kitchen. The granola he has for breakfast is made by an American company with a plant in Ontario, Canada. Due to higher tariffs, the price of this granola has risen more than 40 per cent.
“Shortages and higher prices, there’s no good here,” he maintains.
Experts have tallied the costs. The average US tariff rate in the first quarter was 2.4 per cent, but climbed to 10 per cent in June. The latest levy announcements are set to bring that to more than 18 per cent, according to analysts at Gavekal Research.
The median US household stares down an extra US$1,270 in expenses for 2025, a number projected to reach US$1,619 in 2026.
Economic growth slowed from near 3 per cent in 2024 to about 1.2 per cent over the first half of 2025 and may be zero for the rest of the year. Some models predict wages will fall and leave scars that will stay raw for a generation.
A recession now appears “very, very likely”, to quote Moody’s Analytics chief economist Mark Zandi, who has been warning of this outcome since Mr Trump made his “Liberation Day” tariffs announcement in early April.
Corporate bottom lines tell a similar story. Apple’s June quarter results dazzled, but only because buyers rushed to beat tariffs. The 25 per cent levy on India – where the company now produces its smartphones for the US market – darkens the next quarter.
Amazon says inventories are its buffer now. But the future is “impossible to know”, says its chief executive Andy Jassy as supply chains in China, where the e-commerce giant sources its vast array of products, are in the crosshairs.
Manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers increasingly report paying higher prices for the goods and services they buy and are slowly beginning to raise the prices they charge their customers, says the US Chamber of Commerce.
Higher tariffs will directly punish the domestic manufacturing industry, given that approximately 56 per cent of US imports are composed of raw materials and intermediary and capital goods.
These will especially hit the small businesses that operate on thin margins and will find it harder to absorb the tariffs. Defined as those with fewer than 500 employees, they account for over 40 per cent of the country’s economic activity.
Industry insiders are also sceptical of Mr Trump’s push to expand access for American products. “I don’t know that we wanted zero tariffs on American goods,” said an analyst who advises American businesses operating in South-east Asia. “The more important things are the non-tariff barriers.”
Hoover Institution economist David Henderson narrowed in on the impact of tariffs on the most important actor in the US economy – the consumer.
“For some countries, notably those in the European Union, tariff rates will be lower than they were before Trump began. That is a victory. But we should be clear about whom it’s a victory for,” he noted in a July 31 commentary.
“The main gainers are European consumers, and the secondary gainers are US exporters. The big losers, though, from the high US tariffs, are US consumers and producers who use the tariffed items as inputs, and the secondary losers are foreign exporters,” he said.
He noted that while US consumers will pay a 19 per cent tariff rate on goods from the Philippines and Indonesia, and a 20 per cent on those from Vietnam, their consumers will pay a 0 per cent tariff on imports from the US.
“Don’t get me wrong. I’m glad that people in those three countries, almost all of whom are poorer than the average American, will get the benefits of one-way free trade,” he said.
“But I feel bad for Americans, who will pay higher taxes,” he said.
The deals, although heralded as victories by the Trump Administration, have not been struck in the traditional way. No formal texts bind them; and there seem to be differences in how they are regarded in Washington and overseas.
In his quest for a “good” deal, nation by nation, Mr Trump may have squeezed out some advantages. But will a refusal to consider the reality of an interdependent world come back to bite America in ways not yet apparent?
And no monetary or symbolic victory can be counted as a “good deal” if it results in squandering a precious asset that took the US years to earn – global goodwill.
Can America afford to arm-twist the very same countries whose help it needs in its geopolitical rivalry with China?
And if tariffs continue to be applied in purely mercantilistic terms, they may have the effect of transforming America First into America Alone.